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Purpose:  
Emerging empirical literatures on corruption advocates that 
its impact on overall national economic performance and 
micro-level firm performance is inconclusive. As such 
corruption is said to either ‘grease’ or ‘sand’ in the wheels of 
entrepreneurship, affecting firm performance (at the micro-
level) and, ultimately, economic growth (at the macro-level). 
This study examines this issue using unique and 
exceptionally rich indexes of Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) as a proxy for Corruption and Global Entrepreneurship 
Index (GEI) as a proxy for Entrepreneurship. 
Design/Methodology/Approach:  
Review of the relevant academic literature and regression 
analysis was employed. 
Findings: 
 From the result of analysis, since GEI assigns the highest 
scores to countries most favorable to entrepreneurship while 
the CPI gives its highest scores to countries perceived to be 
the least corrupt.  Thus, a negative correlation suggests that 
the most corrupt countries have the strongest entrepreneurial 
ecosystems.  Thus, it reveals that there exists an inverse 
relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship in 
Nigeria during the quarterly period of the study. Thus, 
depicting that corruption “grease the wheels of 
entrepreneurship”. 
Implications/Originality/Value:  
The contribution offers a comprehensive impact of the 
corruption on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria by 
employing a quarterly data for the period of 2012 to 2020 on 
entrepreneurship development in Nigeria and hints at 
promising areas of future research. 
Research limitations:  
The study employs only secondary data to access the impact 
of corruption on entrepreneurship in Nigeria for only the 
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Does corruption enhance or retard to entrepreneurship? At the starts the enquiry seems to 
be amusing and even surprisingly challenging. It is, however, still controversial among 
researchers which falls on the sides of Sanders and Greases of the wheel of 
entrepreneurship hypothesis. Emerging empirical literatures on corruption advocates that 
it not only affected the nationwide economic performance but also become the cause to 
affect firm at its micro-level performance. 
 
The Sanders school of thought which was coined from the “Sand the Wheels of 
Entrepreneurship” hypothesis postulate that corruption does retard entrepreneurship, 
therefore corruption is perceived as an uncertainty associated with the business 
environment which create room for rent seeking activities such as kickbacks) 
underinvestment in human capital (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005),adverse effect on  
organizational growth  (Aidt, 2009) as well as hurdle for organization to invest and grow 
(Meon and Sekkat, 2005; Fisman & Svensson, 2007).  
 
However, in “greasers” school of thought asserts that deception and fraud enhance 
entrepreneurship. For instances, kickbacks to public office holders would help stimulate 
entrepreneurship especially where business environment is characterized with excessive 
bureaucracy that would somehow or another debilitate intensity (Bardhan, 1997).  
Therefore, the crux of this study is to empirically analyzes  whether corruption  enhance 
or retard entrepreneurship in Nigeria using Corruption Perception Index as a proxy for 
corruption as well as  Global Entrepreneurship Index as a proxy for entrepreneurship 
respectively. 
 
The paper is arranged as follows, Section-1 of the paper provides a short review on 
appropriate literature, whereas section-2 shows the hypothetical framework of study. The 
Section-3 presents experimental literature on corruption as well as on entrepreneurship; 
while the Section-4  provides the explanation  about data and data collection and research 
methodology adopted for the study; the section-5 talks about the exact outcomes of 
analysis, and Section- 6 closes with implication of findings and directions for prospective 
research in future  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical Literature  
This section presents the theoretical framework on corruption and entrepreneurship for 
this study.  
2.1.1. Greasers school of thoughts’ hypothesis on corruption renowned 
as “grease the wheels” 
The study conducted by the greases school of thoughts “grease the wheels” hypothesis of 
corruption opines that implant can act as trouble saving mechanism, thus rising in 
efficiency. Furthermore, the “greasers” school of thought of corruption posits that 
corruption may enhance growth, investment and development in the short run reliant on 
low-grade quality in governance and bureaucratic rules and regulations. They also argue 
that it could also motivate public officials in a situation where the wage is grossly 
insufficient (Leff, 1964, Leys, 1965, Aidt, 2003, Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, Wang and You, 
2012).  





Some of the common consensus among prominent scholars of the “grease the wheels” 
study of hypothesis of corruption is that exploitation may enhance economic 
development by a lot of channels especially when bureaucracy is ill-functioning. 
One channel in ill-functioning of bureaucracy is slowness. Lui (1985), Aidt (2003), 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) applying a formal economic model to calculate the effect of 
venality on material maximization  that venality would proficiently reduce the time 
consumed on files but speed up in transaction process.  The rationale behind this is that 
bribes could serve as a motivation to bureaucrats to fast track the process in a sluggish 
administration. Also, Huntington (1968) affirms that corruption would lessen the dreary 
bureaucratic rules and enhance in growing. The author further cited the United States of 
America railroad utility and Industrial Corporation in the 1870s and 1880s where the 
high-level prevalence of corruption also witnessed rapid growth during the same period. 
Secondly, (Hewitt and Van Rijckeghem (1995) and Méon and Weill (2010) argue that 
another channel through which corruption can drive growth in the presence of ill-
functioning  bureaucracy is focus on the quality of civil/public servant. Also, Leys, 
(1965), Bayley (1966), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Muttreja et al. (2012) 
posit that if wages in government institutions are low or insufficient, corruption (bribes) 
could serve as perks/motivation to civil servants. As a result, this attracts highly skilled 
manpower from poorly remunerated private organizations to government owned 
corporations. 
 
Thirdly, corruption could serve as a means of decision rule by public officials (Beck and 
Maher, 1986, Lien, 1986). For instance, in competition auction or bidding for 
government contracts or projects, the authors assert that only firms that pay the highest 
amount of bribes in such bidding process will win such contracts. Therefore, corruption 
can be said to be a benchmark for granting government procurement contracts. 
Also, Leff, (1964) and Bayley (1966) asserted that corruption might serve as edge against 
unfavorable government policies especially if organizations are biased with 
entrepreneurship owed, for instance, to a conceptual bias. 
 
Furthermore, Leff (1964) asserts that corruption could enhance the quality of investment 
provided if it is in form of tax avoidance and such investment is channeled in high 
yielding project with Return on Investment (ROI). 
 
Akai et al. (2005) argue that, in short run malpractice may neutralize government failure 
and support in economic development and exogenously determine suboptimal 
bureaucratic management system. Recently, Wang and You (2012) confirmed that 
malpractices/corruption may support the best effectual way to bypass most rigid and strict 
rules of laws in China. Also, Dreher and Gassebner (2013), endorsed the same results 
from the study conducted on 43 countries from 2003 to 2005 by using extreme bounds 
analysis. The result indicates that when the Government rules of laws are in its extreme 
level, corruption might be beneficial.  
 
In summary, the aforementioned propositions confirm that corruption may positively 
drive inclusive growth because it greases the adverse defective bureaucracy and bad 
policies.  
 
2.2.2. The Sander school of thoughts’ hypothesis of corruption 
renowned as “sand the wheels” 
The “Sanders” school of thought of corruption affirms that corruption is inimical to 
entrepreneurship, (Mauro, 1995, Tanzi, 1998, Al-Sadig, 2009, Méon and Weill, 2010, 





Ibrahim et al., 2015).  Argue in “sand the wheels” hypothesis of corruption, the 
corruption is a harmful to economic development through several distorting channels. 
Kurer (1993) opined that deceitful officials have an edge to generate other 
misrepresentations in the economy to cover up their ill-gotten wealth. Also, that a “civil 
servant can limit new or other civil servants access to key or “juicy” positions to preserve 
the rent from corruption.  
 
Rose-Ackerman (1997) counter the assumption that graft can promote the choice of the 
right decision as subjective. The authors argue that a firm willing to pay the highest bribe 
tends to compromise in the quality of goods and services to be produced or to be 
rendered. 
 
 In conclusion, the aforementioned argument affirms that corruption may negatively 
retard inclusive growth because of the “sand effect “on investment and good policies.  
2.2. Empirical Literature  
This section presents the empirical literatures on corruption-entrepreneurship nexus.  The 
impact of corruption on entrepreneurship has generated mixed consensus on whether 
corruption does stimulate or negate entrepreneurship. This has led to two distinct schools 
of thought known as The “Sanders” school of thought of corruption and the “greasers” 
school of thought. 
   
The “Sanders” school of thought of corruption postulate  that corruption retards 
entrepreneurship some of the major contributors to this school of thought include Ugur 
and Dasgupta (2011), Aidt et al. (2008), Meon and Sekkat (2005), Mendez and 
Sepulveda (2005) and Gyimah-Brempong (2002) who opined that corruption retards 
entrepreneurship through following channels  such as reduction on marginal return on 
investment (ROI) as well as a “Sand in wheel” of growth in smaller institutions that’s 
also creates handedness  in the growth  process of developing countries which mostly 
have small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs)  as the pillar  for  their economies                 
(Fisman andSvensson, 2007; Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993 and Klitgaard, 
1991). 
 
However, the “greasers” school of thought assert that corruption enhance 
entrepreneurship especially in environment where exist high level of bureaucracy coupled 
with weak institution. Some of the contributors of this school of thought included 
Mironov,2005; Dreher and Gassebner ,2011; O’Toole and Tarp 2014). (Mironov 2005) 
investigate the corruption –entrepreneurship nexus in 141 countries for the period of 1996 
to 2004. The result revealed that corruption does enhance entrepreneurship especially in 
countries with weaker institutions. He further, assert that during the process entrepreneurs 
might evade or pay less taxes and therefore releases more monies for entrepreneurs to 
expand their business, therefore make them more productive/ profits. Besides, Dreher and 
Gassebner (2011) examined the impact of corruption over the sample size of 43 countries 
data on entrepreneurship covering the period of 2003 to 2005. Their result show that 
corruption does have a moderated effect on entrepreneurship that is,a rise in  corruption 
index by one point decreases  the growth  in entrepreneurship by 0.31% points. 
Henceforth, the over all, as per the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis, some corruption may 
help facilitate commerce in an otherwise business-unfriendly environment.  
3. Methodology 
This section demonstrates the data employed for the study as well as its source, and 





methodology applied for estimation. It also explains the econometric model analyzed 
with estimation technique.  
3.1. Description of the Data Set 
This study is conducted in Nigerian context, for the quarterly periods of 2012 Q1 to 2020 
Q4. Data sources are from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Global 
Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) in quarterly basis. In this study, Global Entrepreneurship 
Index is the dependent variable denoted by GEI while Corruption Perception Index 
denoted by (CPI).  EVIEWS 9.0 is the software package used for calculation of our 
results.  
 
3.2. Model Specification 
The model adopted for this study similar to that used by Dumitrescu, M.S., et al (2020), 
which show an impact of corruption on entrepreneurship. The model which include 
Corruption variable to ascertain its impact on Entrepreneurship (GEI) as was done by 
Dumitrescu, M.S., et al (2020), consistent with neoclassical growth theory. 
3.  ……………………….. (1) 
Where  
GEI - Global Entrepreneurship Index 
 CPI -Corruption Perception Index 
 The expected apriori sign of corruption on entrepreneurship could be positive or negative 
has stated by grease and sand hypothesis of corruption. 
4. Results & Discussions  
This section presents the result of impact of corruption on entrepreneurship in Nigeria. 
4.1.    Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 below represents the summary statistics of variables used in the study. Mean 
distribution of all variables was presented in second row of this table. The mean value is 
unarguably one vital tool in determining the central tendencies of the data set. Third row 
of this table reflects the maximum, whereas; fourth row of the table represents the 
minimum value in the data set of all variables. The fifth row in this table shows the 
standard deviation value within result. The GEI that is taken as dependent variable for the 
study purposes has a maximum value i.e. 22.70000, while the minimum value in the data 
set is 0.000000 having its mean value 8.279412 that is moderately closer to maximum 
value   as compared to minimum value.  However, the entrepreneurship (GEI) level in 
Nigerian context is relatively high.  On the basis of our review we are confident that 
entrepreneurship in Nigerian context remains relatively high. 
Moreover, the results for all the independent variable, namely, CPI follow same pattern 
of maximum and minimum trends by entrepreneurship (GEI). As an illustration, the CPI 
demonstrates maximum value i.e. 28.00000, while the minimum value is 25.00000 
having mean value of 26.44118 that is very near to the minimum value as compared to its 
maximum value. Hence, on the basis of these results we can infer that CPI is very 












Table 1: Descriptive statistics Nigeria 
 GEI CPI 
 Mean  8.2794  26.441 
 Median  0.0000  26.500 
 Maximum  22.700  28.000 
 Minimum  0.0000  25.0000 
 Std. Dev.  10.029  0.7527 
 Observations  17  17 
                       Source: Author’s own elaboration 
     4.2. Covariance matrix for corruption and its impact on 
entrepreneurship in Nigeria 
Table-2 reflects covariance structure of the variables selected for study. Study variables 
demonstrate the divergent relationship with each other. Conversely, we draw especial 
interest on the relationship among our dependent variable i.e. GEI with another 
independent variables as shown in the given table, as this is our key concern in this part 
of the study. The GEI slightly as well as adversely correlates with CPI with value of 
0.539923. Study coefficients are statistically significant at 5% significance level. These 
results demonstrate a weak correlation among endogenous and exogenous variables. On 
the basis of our analysis and results we are confident to say no multicollinearity exist 
within the model. 
Table.2: Correlation Analysis 
 GEI CPI 
GEI  1.000000  
CPI -0.539923  1.000000 
                           Source: Author’s own elaboration 
4.3.1.   Regression Results  
In order to highlighting the dependence among our endogenous variable i.e. Global 
Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) with exogenous variable i.e., Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) we developed a regression model based on the following linear equation.  
                                 ……………………….. (2) 
Econometric model is being estimated on the basis of values within two variables i.e.: 
      Forecast GEI=   ……………………….. (3) 
On the basis of our estimation it can be concluded that our study model is valid at 
significance level of 5%, (see significance F-value = 0.0000), variation in our dependent 
variable i.e. CPI explaining 94.4% from the variation of GEI. However, coefficient of 
variable CPI is statistically significant at significance level of 5%, (see p-value=0.0000) 
it clearly reflects that an increase in CPI with one unit will lead to cause in growth of GEI 





with value of 0.95%. 
 
Table.3: Regression Analysis 
 Source: Author’s own elaboration 
From the result of analysis above, since GEI assigns the highest score to countries most 
favorable to entrepreneurship, while the CPI gives its highest score to countries perceived 
to be the least corrupt.  Thus, a negative correlation suggests that the most corrupt 
countries have the strongest entrepreneurial ecosystems.  Thus, it reveals that there exists 
an inverse relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship in Nigeria during the 
quarterly period of the study. Thus, depicting that corruption “greases the wheels of 
entrepreneurship”.  
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this article thus validates that corruption enhance entrepreneurship in 
Nigeria due to excess bureaucracy witness in Nigeria during the period under study. 
Future research on this area might be the exploration of factors that contributed on the 
growth of these two in indexes and how they might be extended to the other countries 
like African and Asian. 
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Dependent Variable: GEI   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
CPI -7.194 2.895664 -2.484348 0.0253 
C 8.493 76.59395 2.591496 0.0204 
R-squared 0.915 Mean dependent var 8.279412 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944284 S.D. dependent var 10.02954 
S.E. of regression 8.718870 Akaike info criterion 7.278987 
Sum squared resid 1140.280 Schwarz criterion 7.377012 
Log likelihood 
-59.87139 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.288731 
F-statistic 0.0000 Durbin-Watson stat 0.123060 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.025274   
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